To achieve the fairness and the privacy of the e-commence, and also to consider the quantum security of the e-commence, a lattice-based encrypted verifiably encryption signature scheme (EVES) is proposed in this paper. We achieve the strong unforgeability and the opacity properties in the standard model over lattice without the help of the lattice-based delegation technologies which is one of main tools to achieve the standard model security for the lattice-based cryptography. It is shown that the proposed scheme can be used to design a fair and privacy-preserving e-commence system in cloud, not only for business-to-customer business(B2C) but also for customer-to-customer business(C2C). The main reason is that the verifier can read the details of the EVES by easily computation operations before the EVES is verified. Then the seller who acts as a verifier in EVES scheme can ask a proxy sever to deal the business for him. Then the seller does not need to keep online for most of time. Moreover, we compare the proposed EVES with some known lattice-based VES schemes. Besides the proposed scheme achieves the more cryptographic functions, such as EVES vs VES and standard model vs random oracle model etc., the proposed scheme even has some advantage about the computation cost compared with known lattice-based VES schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of the network and the electronic commerce (e-commence), more and more transactions are finished on the line. It is estimated that more than 230 million U.S people finish their shopping activations online. More than 8 billion Chinese use the mobile payments for their daily consumption. The huge demands for mobile e-commerce have lead to more and more electronic business platforms, such as Amazon, Taobao, eBay and joybuy etc. Any buyer can buy goods from a seller though these electronic business platforms. With the development of the e-commerce, more and more security requires should be paid attentions on, such as the security of the fund, the fairness and the privacy of the business etc. To achieve the security of the fund, the digital signature algorithm can be used to generate the e-check. Only
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Cristina Rottondi . the e-check is verified, the money can be pay paid to the seller. While the traditional signature schemes can not achieve the fairness of the e-commence. For example, if the buyer has signed and sent the e-check to the seller before the seller sends the goods to him, it is obviously unfairness for the buyer. Otherwise, if the seller sends the goods firstly, it is also unfair for the seller.
The verifiable encryption signature (VES) [1] can be used to solve the fairness of the e-commence. By using a VES, the buyer is allowed to sign a e-check to the seller, but the seller can not possess this e-check until the buyer received goods. In this phase, the e-check is encrypted by the public key of a trusted third party called a adjudicator. The buyer should make the seller believe that the received result is a valid encryption of the signed e-check. Since the adjudicator can decrypt the VES to get the original signature, once adjudicator is malicious or injured, the fairness even the cash security of the e-commence would be injured. It seemed that VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ there is no other choice for both the buyer and the seller than to trust adjudicator completely. It is clearly unfair for this case in electronic business. On the other hand, the VES can be verified publicly by anyone. Then one can know the transaction behavior between the buyer and seller which also means the privacy of the business is revealed. The fairness and the privacy of the e-commence should be paid more attentions when the e-commence is becoming more and more popular.
A modification of VES called encrypted verifiably encryption signature scheme (EVES) [2] can be used to protect the privacy of the e-commence. In a EVES scheme, the VES would be encrypted by the seller's public key. As a result, only by the cooperation of the seller and the adjudicator, can get the original signature from the EVES. It is clearly that the privacy of the transaction and also the security of the e-check can be protected by the EVES scheme in the e-commence. Moreover, the EVES scheme also sure that the EVES can not be verified except by the seller.
A. MOTIVATIONS
The routine design of the EVES schemes is to encrypt the VES under the public key of the verifier. The seller even can not know any trusted information about this business unless the EVES is decrypted and the EVES is verified. 1 It is very inconvenient for the seller if he checks every EVES and sends goods one by one. The following two requirements are necessary.
• A seller in B2C commence wishes to centralized verify the EVES and he also wishes the goods can be prepared by his staff before he deals with the EVES. (Different goods may be chosen by different buyers on the platform and the number of the EVES would be large.)
• A seller in C2C commence wishes to use a proxy sever to deal with the business online for him (Surely B2C commence also can has this requirement). For the security of the cash, the seller wishes to verify EVES by himself and the seller wishes the proxy sever has prepared the goods according to the list of goods before he verified the EVES.
No matter any cases, the EVES is wished to satisfy the following properties. P1. A EVES can not be publicly verified except the seller. P2. The information of the business like the list of goods etc, can be easily got by several operations which are more easier than the operations of to verify the EVES.
If the list of goods can be got, the goods can be prepared before the EVES is verified. Once the EVES is verified, goods are sent to the buyer at the first time. Then, the efficiency of the seller would be improved and the buyer can receive his goods as soon as possible. At the same time, EVES with property P2 can be used in cloud to proxy the sever to manage the business for the seller as shown as described. If we let the platform act as a adjudicator in the application of EVES, 1 For efficiency and privacy reason, we suppose that the original message does not consist the information of chosen goods in this paper. Figure 1 shows how a EVES with property P2 to use in e-commence. As a result, it is interesting to come up a approach to achieve property P2 for the application of EVES in e-commence.
B. RELATED WORK
Since VES gives a solution to fair exchange between distrusted parties, many VES schemes have been proposed [3] - [5] which can be used in fair signature exchange, certified e-mails etc. The first VES in the standard model is proposed by Lu et al in 2013 [6] . Chen et al. proposed a EVES scheme by using pairing [2] . Zhang et al. proposed a EVES scheme in which the buyer can ask a cloud sever to generate a EVES for him by obfuscated program [7] . Both [2] and [7] only considers the existential unforgeability of VES while Wang et al. [8] showed that existential unforgeability of VES is not enough to protect the security of the e-pay systems. It is advised that the strong unforgeability for VES should be seemed as the proper security notion.
If we considered the quantum attack, these VES [3]- [5] and EVES schemes [2] , [7] are not secure under the quantum attack. Lattice-based cryptography is known for its post-quantum security. Rückert proposed a VES scheme in the standard model over ideal lattice by using Merkle authentication trees, maskable signatures and weaker-than-CPA secure encryptions [9] . The sizes of secret keys and signatures in Rückert's scheme [9] grow with the parameter l which denoted the number of the signature. Kim K S et al. and Zhang et al design more efficient VES schemes than the scheme in [9] over lattice respectively while the securities of these schemes are based on the random oracle model [10] , [11] .
On the other hand, note that the matrix operations (multiplication etc.) whose computational complexity are O(n 3 ) have been used several times in the schemes in [10] , [11] . Since all matrices in lattice-based VES normally with huge number of row and column, it leads to the proposed schemes in [10] , [11] still with low computational efficiency. As a result, to design an efficient lattice-based VES (EVES) in the standard model is an interesting work for both lattice-based cryptography and the studies of VES. At last, all known EVES schemes do not satisfy property P2. As described, property P2 is necessary for the seller when he wants to use a proxy sever to deal with the business online.
C. OUR WORK
In this paper, we give an possible solution of the privacy of the e-commence by the lattice-based cryptographic tool. Our main result is a lattice-based EVES scheme in the standard model. More precisely, we described our constructions from two aspects as follows:
1. We propose a lattice-based EVES scheme and prove the strong unforgeability and opacity of the proposed scheme base on the hardness of the shortest integer solution problem and the learning with errors problem in the standard model respectively. Different from the most of the lattice-based signature schemes without random oracle, the lattice-based delegation technical [16] , [17] is not used in the proposed scheme. As a result, our scheme as a lattice-based scheme shares some advantages in the public key length and compute efficiency.
2. Since the proposed scheme satisfies both properties P1 and P2, a fair and privacy-preserving e-commence systems is directly achieved. Informally, P1 leads to the privacy of the business is protected. The property P2 means that the seller can get the list of goods from EVES by easily computation before the EVES is verified in our scheme. Hence, as described above, the proposed EVES can be used to design a fair and private e-commence system with a proxy sever in cloud.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Some basic notions of lattices and EVES, and basic design tools used in this paper are introduced in section II. Section III proposes a lattice-based EVES scheme without the random oracle. Section IV we gives an analysis of the proposed EVES scheme. Section V gives an application of proposed EVES to e-commence. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. NOTATIONS
Bold lower-case letters like c are used to denote vectors in the column form and bold upper-case letters like T are used to denote matrices in this paper. For constant c > 0, ω(f (n)) is a function which grows faster than cf (n). poly(n) denotes an unspecified function f (n) = O(n c ) for a constant c. The Euclide norm of a vector which is written as ||·||. The norm of a matrix is defined as the norm of its longest column. Given a matrix T, its Gram-Schmidt orthogonalized matrix is denoted byT. D ,σ,c denotes the Gaussian distribution with center c and parameter σ over lattice .
B. ENCRYPTED VERIFIABLY ENCRYPTION SIGNATURE AND ITS APPLICATION
A EVES scheme consists of the following six efficient algorithms.
KG Inputting the secure parameter n, this algorithm consists as three algorithms which generate all the public keys and private keys for signer, verifier and the the adjudicator, denoted by (pk s , sk s ), (pk v , sk v ), (pk a , sk a ) respectively. Sign, Verify: These two algorithms are the same as in the standard signature schemes.
EVESCreate: Given (sk s , pk a , pk v , M ),, it computes a EVES ω on this message. EVESVerify: Given signer's public key pk s , a message M , an adjudicator public key pk a , a EVES ω on message M ,and verifier's public key pk v , it outputs 1 if ω is a valid VES on M , otherwise outputs 0.
Adjudicate: Given (pk s , pk v , sk a , ω, M ), partly extracts an ordinary signature v on M under pk s . Note that v is not the real output of the sign algorithm. The verifier can easily extract the real signature from v.
A EVES should require the following security properties [19] : Correctness: Both VESigVerify and Verify should hold for all M and for all properly generated key-pairs for the siner, verifier and adjudicator.
Strong Unforgeability: A EVES scheme is strong unforgeable if the advantage of any probabilistic polynomialtime (PPT) adversary in the following game is negligible. The unforgeability means that it is difficult to forge a valid EVES.
where C 1 (·) = C(sk s , pk s , * ), C 2 (·) = C(sk s , pk a , pk v , * ), A(·) = A(sk a , pk a , pk s , pk v , * ).
Return 1 iff EVESVerify(pk s , pk v , pk a , ω * , m * ) = 1 and (pk s , pk v , pk a , ω * , m * ) is not an output ofC(sk s , pk a , pk v ) (No matter m * is queried or not).
The advantage of the adversary is defined to the probability of the adversary to win the game.
Opacity: A EVES satisfies the opacity property if the advantage of any PPT adversary in the following game is negligible. The advantage of the adversary is defined to the probability of the adversary to win the game. The Opacity means that it is difficult to extract an ordinary signature on the same message according to a given verifiably encrypted signature.
where C 1 (·) = C(sk s , pk s , * ), C 2 (·) = C(sk s , pk a , pk v , * ), A(·) = A(sk a , pk a , pk s , pk v , * )
Return 1 iff Verify(pk s , ω * , m * ) = 1 and A has never queried A(sk a , pk a , pk s , pk v , * ) about m * . VOLUME 7, 2019
As we have described, EVES scheme can be used to preserve both the fairness and privacy of the e-commence. Fig. 2 show the process that the EVES signature is used to achieve the fairness and privacy of the customer-tocustomer e-commence where the platform acts as the role of adjudicator. 1. Only the buyer has received goods and satisfies the goods, can the adjudicator help the seller to decrypt the EVES. On the other hand, if the buyer receives the goods but refuses to inform the adjudicator, the seller also can ask the adjudicator to arbitrate and decrypt the EVES.
2. Since the EVES is encrypted, it can not be verified except by the cooperation of the seller and the adjudicator. Hence the fairness and the privacy of the e-commence also are realized by using EVES.
C. LATTICE

Given n linearly independent vectors
Given A ∈ Z n×m q for integers (q, m, n), a special class of q-ary lattices are defined as follows,
The following lemma shows that ⊥ q (A) and its trapdoor basis T can be generated by a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm.
Lemma 1 (The Trapdoor Sampling Algorithm [12] ): Inputting 1 n , q = poly(n), m > 5n log q, there is a PPT algorithm which outputs A ∈ Z n×m q whose distribution is closed to the uniform distribution, and S ⊂ ⊥ q (A) satisfying S ≤ O(n log q) Moreover, S can be efficiently converted to a trapdoor basis T of the lattice ⊥ q (A).
D. GAUSSIAN DISTRIBUTION
Let σ > 0 be a parameter and vector c a center, the discrete Gaussian function on R m is defined as:
. D ⊥ q (A),σ,c (x) can be seemed as a ''conditional'' distribution which is defined by sampling x ∈ R n from a Gaussian distribution with the parameter σ , then under the condition of the event x ∈ ⊥ q (A). When c = 0, D ⊥ q (A),σ,0 is abbreviated as ρ σ and D ⊥ q (A),σ . We wish the original signature of the message to distribute according to the Gaussian distribution in this paper, because a Gaussian distributed signature almost perfectly conceals the information about the sign key of the signer. Let be an n-dimensional lattice and > 0. The smoothing parameter η ( ) is defined to be the smallest positive σ satisfying
E. GAUSSIAN SAMPLE
There are two approaches to sample a Gaussian vector. One is to sample a vector by preimage sample function (PSF) though the trapdoor basis of lattice [14] . The other is to use the reject sample technical of Vadim Lyubashevsky [15] . This paper uses the first approach to design the EVES scheme. Lemma 2 defines a PSF which uses a trapdoor basis of the lattice as a trapdoor. Lattice-based delegation technologies [16] , [17] which can be seemed as a development of the PSF, is used in the scheme of [10] , [11] to design lattice-based VES. Moreover, it is also an important tool to design the signature scheme in the standard model over lattice. Just as described in Section 1, one of the aims of this paper is achieve the security in the standard model without using Lattice-based delegation technologies. Lemma 2 (PSF [14] ): Given a trapdoor basis T of an ndimensional lattice ⊥ q (A), a Gaussian parameter σ > || B|| · ω( √ log n), and a center c ∈ R n , there is a PPT algorithm, PreSample(A, T, σ, c), outputs a vector e from a distribution that is statistically close to Gaussian distribution D ,σ,c .
The following algorithm is proposed in [18] to design lattice-based group signature. In this paper we use the algorithm in the following lemma to generate the public key and private key of the signer. 1. Compute Ty = Te(modq). Since both T and e are with short norm, Te(modq) = Te holds with an overwhelming probability.
2. Compute e = T −1 Te(modq).
Find vector s from A, e, y.
The SIS problem defined over ⊥ q (A) is widely used to sure the security of the lattice-based signature scheme. Let (n, m, q) be parameters.
Definition 2: The SIS problem is defined as follows: given a real β and A ∈ Z n×m q , find a nonzero vector e ∈ Z m q satisfying Ae = 0(modq) and ||e|| ≤ β. The following lemma [19] shows that there is a noninteractive zero-knowledge proof system (NIZK) based on the plain LWE which can be used directly in the proposed scheme.
Lemma 4: If LWE problem with suitable polynomial factors is hard to solve, there exists a statistically zero-knowledge noninteractive argument system having a common random string, and a adaptively computational zero-knowledge noninteractive proof system having a common reference string.
III. LATTICE-BASED ENCRYPTED VERIFIABLY ENCRYPTION SIGNATURE SCHEME
Let n be a secure parameter in proposed scheme. Set q = poly(n), m > n + 8n log q, s ≥ kω( log m).
Let k be an integer. The EVES scheme consists of three parties, signer Alice, verifier Bob and a trusted party Adjudicator.
Kg. Both Adjudicator and the verifier generate their public key and private key by the lemma 1, set (B, T) and (C, T c ) respectively. The verifier also randomly chooses a vector w ∈ Z n q as a label of the VES. In application of the ecommence, w ∈ Z n q can denote the goods detail which mean it is reasonable. Signer uses Lemma 3 to generate the public/private key (A, T ) satisfying 1. AB t = 0(modq), 2. AT = 0(modq), 3. T < O(n log q). The signer also randomly chooses c 0 , c 1 , · · · , c k ∈ Z m q . Hence, pk s = (A, c 0 , c 1 , · · · , c k ), sk s = T . pk v = (C, w), sk v = T c . pk a = B, sk a = T.
Sign. Given a message M = (m 1 , m 2 , · · · , m k ) ∈ Z k 2 , signer generates the signature: e ← SamplePre (A, T , c, s) where
Verify. The original signature can be verified as follows,
Remark 1: It seem that the existence of the label w in the EVES is uncomplicated, even cumbersome. But we will show that it is reasonable when the label is used to describe the order or the goods detail in e-commence in Section V.
EVESCreate. Signer randomly chooses s 1 , s 2 ∈ Z n q . Then 1. e ← D m Z q , s, 0 and b = e + e (modq) 2. e ← SamplePre(A, T , w, s), 3. y 1 = B t s 1 + e + e (modq), y 2 = C t s 2 + e (modq). 4. Generate a NIZK π to prove that vector y 1 is close to the lattice (B t ) [18] .
Then the EVES of M is ω = (b, y 1 , y 2 , π). EVESVerify Verifier firstly decrypt y 2 to get e ans computes
Then accepts the EVES if and only if 1. Checks π is true. 2. Checks Ae = w(modq) and w = c−(Ab−Ay 1 )(modq).
b ≤ 2s
√ m, Remark 2: Before runs EVESVerify algorithm, the verifier also can get the label of the EVES by w = c − (Ab − Ay 1 )(modq). Then the proposed scheme satisfies property P2.
Adjudicate.
Adjudicator use his private key to compute e + e from y 1 . Then e + e is sent to the verifier. Since verifier knows e , He can get e and e immediately.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE EVES SCHEME A. CORRECTNESS
For secure parameter n, sets m = n + cn log q, q = cn 2 , s > n 2 log n, k = n/2. of the EVES is the GPV signature in [14] . The correctness of the original signature is apparently.
For a EVES (b, y 1 , y 2 ) of M, the verifier can use his private key to get e from y 2 . Since e ← SamplePre (A, T , w, s) , VOLUME 7, 2019 
As a result, a legal EVES can be accepted by the verifier.
B. PRIVACY
The Adjudicate decrypts y 1 and get e + e (modq), while he can not know e . As a result, the Adjudicate can not get the original signature. Hence, the signature privacy of the Adjudicate holds. More over, since the Adjudicate does not know e , he even can not get any information about the VES from observing the label w.
The verifier can decrypt y 2 to get the necessary information e about the VES, while he can not know e + e (modq) only when get the help of the Adjudicate. Then the verifier also can not get the original signature without the help of the Adjudicate.
C. EFFICIENCY COMPARISON
Since the proposed scheme is the first EVES on lattice, we only compare the proposed scheme with two known lattice-based VES schemes. We firstly considered the cryptographic function in Table 1 . Let the length of π be l, the space size of the schemes is compared in Table 2 . It is shown by table II that both the public size and the EVES size of the proposed scheme are shorter than those of the scheme in [10] respectively. There is no advantage about space size for this paper compared with [11] . Table 1 and Table 4 show that the proposed scheme shares some advantages about the cryptographic function and the computational efficiency.
We continue to compare the computation cost of the proposed scheme with known schemes. Firstly, we analyze the main computation operations of these schemes. There consist as the trapdoor sample algorithm(lemma 1), the presample algorithm (lemma2), Sampling Orthogonal Lattices with Trapdoors(lemma 3), sample a vector, matrix and vector multiplication and matrix and matrix multiplication whose the computation cost are denoted by ts, ps, os, sv, mv and mm respectively. Then the following Table 3 shows main computation operations and their complexity in related schemes. We use |π | and |π | to denote the computation cost to generate NIZK and verify NIZK respectively. We have omitted the easily operations such as vector addition and hash operations just for simplicity. Then Table 4 shows the details of computation cost comparison. It is clearly that the proposed EVES scheme is more efficient than the known lattice-based VES schemes, even the proposed scheme has achieved more cryptographic function.
From Table 4 , the only inefficient algorithm for the proposed scheme is the kg algorithm for signer, because we want to achieve the standard model security and we need use k vectors to encode the message. Except the kg algorithm, the proposed scheme shares some advantages about the computation efficiency than that in both [10] and [11] .
To check the efficiency of the proposed scheme, we use NTL to implement the proposed schemes and related schemes. All operations are tested on a PC with AMD Ryzen 53500U (2.1GHz), 2G RAM and the running environment is Linux. Since the experimental condition is limited, we only can test the proposed scheme with small lattice dimensions: 72, 90, 111 and q = 93, 251, 499 respectively. Let all schemes sign the same message, and we get ten group data for ten different messages. The average results show that all EVESCreate, EVESVerify, Adjudicate algorithms of the proposed scheme with the lest running time compared with those of the schemes in [10] and [11] . Figure 3 only shows the details of the comparison about the running time (s) of the EVESCreate algorithms in relaxed literatures.
D. UNFORGEABILITY AND OPACITY
Theorem 1: If there is a PPT adversary against the strong unforgeability of the proposed EVES scheme with advantage , a challenger can be constructed to solve the SIS problem with the advantage negligibly close to .
Proof: Suppose there is a adversary to forge the EVES with a advantage , then we construct a challenger to solve the SIS problem as follows.
Suppose the challenger receives an SIS instance (A, n, m, q, s) , then challenger simulates the Kg algorithm as follows.
1. Randomly chooses k + 1 vectors e 0 , e 1 , · · · , e k according to the Gaussian distribution D 2 m ,2s/(k+1),0 in which 2s/k = O(n log q)/m. Computes Ae i = c i (modq) for i = 0, 1, 2 · · · , k. Let (A, c 0 , c 1 , · · · , c k ) be the public key of the signer.
2. Generates B ∈ Z n×m q satisfies AB t = 0(modq). Then B is the public key of the Adjudicate. Notice that the challenger does not know the private key of the Adjudicate.
3. Generate the public key and private key of the verifier which denotes (C, w, T ) just as the Kg algorithm. Generates labels w i = Ae i (modq), in which e i is distributed to the Gaussian distribution D 2 m ,s/2,0 .
All (e 0 , e 1 , . . . , e k , e 1 , · · · , e i ) are stored in L 1 . The adversary is permit to play the game in definition 1. To simulate the EVES create process, the challenger keeps others two lists L 2 and L 3 to store the answers of the sign queries and the VES queries respectively. VES queries. For a VES query (M, w i ), The challenger checks the lists L 1 and L 2 to get e i the original signature e, and then challenger generates the EVES just set e = e i in the the EVESCreate algorithm of Section 3. The challenger also stores (e, e , e i , y 1 , s 1 , y 2 , M) to L 3 .
Adjudicate queries. For a EVES (b, y 1 , y 2 ), the challenger can ''decrypt'' y 2 to get e . Then the challenger checks e in L 3 , and sends e +e to the adversary. The adversary can check it by y 1 − (e + e ) ∈ (B).
Finally, the adversary outputs a forged EVES (b, y 1 , y 2 ) with advantage on message M * . The challenger ''decrypts'' y 2 to get e . Then the challenger finds e by checking e in L 3 . Then, challenger gets the forged original signature e.
The challenger computesẽ = e 0 + k i=1 m i e i (modq) according to the arrays in list L 1 and the message M * . If e =ẽ, aborts. Otherwise, e =ẽ whose probability is 1 − 2 −ω(logn) [14] , then Ae = Aẽ(modq). Hence, A(e −ẽ) = 0(modq) and e −ẽ(modq) is a solution of the SIS instance.
As a result, the challenger solve the SIS instance with the advantage (1 − 2 −ω(log n) ) ≈ .
Theorem 2: If there is a PPT adversary against the opacity opacity of the proposed EVES scheme with advantage , by accessing the VES queries q 1 times and adjudication queries q 2 times, there is a challenger can be constructed to solve the LWE problem with the advantage negligibly close to .
Proof: Suppose the challenger receives an LWE instance (B, n, m, q, y) which needs to find s ∈ Z n q , x ∈ Z m q satisfying y = B t s + x and x ≤ qα √ 2m. In this process, we suppose that, the challenger can sure that y is a LWE instance by getting a NIZK π 1 .
KG. The challenger firstly generates (A ∈ Z n×m q , T ∈ the Lemma 3. The challenger generates the public key and private key of the verifier just as the KG. algorithm in section 3. For a message set (M 1 , M 2 , . . . , M q 1 ), the challenger guesses an index i * . Then M i * = (m i * 1 , · · · , m i * k ). Randomly chooses c 1 , · · · , c k ∈ Z m q . Set
Hence, pk s = (A, {c i } k 0 ) and pk a = B. The challenger also generates w ∈ Z n q as a label. Two lists L 1 and L 2 are used to store the answers to the sign queries and EVES queries.
Sign queries. Since the challenger knows the private key T ∈ Z m×m q of the signer, the challenger can generate a original signature for any message M i by e i ←   SamplePre(A, T , c 
m j c j (modq). Note that for the message M i * , the original signature e i * satisfying Ae i * = −y(modq). e i is sent to the adversary and it also is stored to L 1 . The adversary surly can verify the original signature e i is right.
EVES queries. For a fresh EVES query, the challenger checks the message's original signature denoted by e i from L 1 firstly. Then, If i = i * , challenger does:
1. e ← SamplePre (A, T , w, s) 3. y i1 = y + e (modq), y i2 = C t s 2 + e (modq). 4. Generate the NIWI π to sure that y i1 is close to the lattice (B t ).
Then, it can be checked that A(e i − e i ) − Ay i1 = c − w(modq) holds. As a result, (b, y 1 , y 2 , π) is the answer of the EVES query.
If i = i * , The challenger generates the EVES as shown as the EVESCreat algorithm.
Not matter i = i * or not, (e, e , e , y 1 , y 2 , π) is stored to L 2 . Adjudication query. If i = i * , aborts. Otherwise, the challenger can use the records of L 1 and L 2 to get e + e and then he can answer the adjudication query.
After finished all the queries, the adversary outputs a standard signature e j with advantage which is not queried in Adjudication query. If j = i * , then checks e i * and y i1 from L 2 . Hence y j1 − e j − e j = B t s. The challenger get s and it solve the LWE instance.
V. APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED EVES SCHEME IN E-COMMENCE
The proposed scheme can be used to design a fair and privacy-preserving e-commence system. Let the buyer be the signer in the proposed scheme whose public key is A, c 0 · · · , c k . The public key of seller who is the verifier in the EVES scheme is C. The information of goods is denoted by w. The public key of the platform which acts as Adjudicator is B. All the private keys are the same as the proposed scheme. Let M denote the e-check. Since the proposed Procedure 1 Purchase The buy: uses his private key to finish the purchase for some goods. 1: Choose the goods from the ship of the seller online. The information of chosen goods is denoted by w 2: generates and sends EVES (M , (b, y 1 , y 2 , π)) to the seller.
EVES satisfies P2 property, the seller can use a proxy sever to manage the business online. More precisely, Just as the steps of the shopping on line, the fair and privacy-preserving e-commence system also has the following three procedures. The first procedure, called Purchase, allows the buyer to choose his goods and sign a e-check to the seller by using the proposed EVES to protect his fairness and privacy. In this phase, to consider the privacy of the e-commence, the signed message M should not consist the goods information, for example, M only is a blank check.
The second procedure, called Check and Supply, allows the proxy sever can manage the goods order online and prepare the goods before the seller verifies the e-check. Once the seller keeps online and verifies the e-check, proxy sever would send the goods to the buyer at the first time.
Remark 3: If the seller does not use the proxy sever to deal his business, the Check and supply procedure also finished by the seller just as shown as the EVESVerify.
Remark 4: If the proxy sever is trust, the step 7 of the seller is also can be omitted. That is, step 7 can be finished by the 5: Ae = w = c − Ab − Ay 1 (modq). 6: Checks π and e + e ≤ 2s √ m, 7: w = c − Ab − Ay 1 (modq). 8: Informs the sever to send goods to the buyer. 9: Sends y 1 to the platform.
Procedure 3 Cash
The platform: decrypts the EVES to the seller until received the buyer's approvement. 1: Computes e + e from y 1 2: Sends e + e to the seller. the seller: Gets the e-check under the help of the the platform 3: Gets e and e and then He gets e-check. % He knows e . sever and the computation cost of the seller would be reduced further.
The last procedure, called Cash, allows the platform to help the seller to decrypt the e-check and receive the cash after the buyer had received his goods and felt satisfy.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper proposed a lattice-based EVES scheme. In the standard model, we prove that the strong unforgeablity is based on the hardness of the SIS problem and the opacity of the proposed scheme is based on the hardness of the LWE problem. Moreover, the proposed scheme can be easily used to achieve the fairness and privacy of the e-commence. On the other hand, since the goods order of the e-commence can be read by once matrix and vector multiplication, then the proposed EVES scheme can allow the seller to use a proxy sever to manage his business. As a result, the proposed EVES gives a possible solution to fair electronic transaction in cloud. We also compare the proposed scheme with known VES schemes over lattice, the results show that the proposed scheme with more high computation efficiency and more cryptographic function.
